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Marijuana policy analyses typically focus on the relative costs and benefits of
present policy and its feasible alternatives. This Essay addresses a prior, threshold
issue: whether maryuana criminal laws abridge fundamental individual rights, and if
so, whether there are grounds thatjustify doing so. Over 700, 000 people are arrested
annually for simple marijuana possession, a small but significant proportion of the
100 million Americans who have committed the same crime. In this Essay, we present
a civil libertarian case for repealing maryuana possession laws. We put forward two
arguments corresponding to the two distinct liberty concerns implicated by laws that
both ban marjuana use and punish its users. The first argument opposes
criminalization and demonstrates that marijuana use does not constitute the kind of
wrongful conduct that is a prerequisite for just punishment. The second argument
demonstrates that even in the absence of criminal penalties, prohibition ofmaryuana
use violates a moral right to exercise autonomy in personal matters-a corollary to
John Stuart Mill's harm principle in the utilitarian tradition, or, in the
nonconsequentialist tradition, to the respect for personhood that was well described
by the Supreme Court in its Lawrence v. Texas opinion. Both arguments are based on
principles ofjustice that are uncontroversial in other contexts.
INTRODUCTION
The federal government and thirty-seven states make possession of marijuana a
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.' Federal law categorizes marijuana with
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1. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006) (stating that possession of a controlled substance is
unlawful); see also id. § 812(c) sched. I(c)(10) (2006) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I
controlled substance). Under federal law, marijuana possession is punishable by one year in
prison and a minimum fine of $1000. Id. § 844(a). For a compilation of state marijuana laws and
their penalties, see Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, State by State Laws,
http://www.natlnorml.org/index.cfm?GrouplD=4516.
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the most dangerous of illicit drugs, 2 and the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) has generally treated marijuana control as a top priority.3 In
recent years, federal and state laws have resulted in the arrest of more than 700,000
Americans annually for marijuana possession,4 a crime that almost 100 million
Americans have committed.5
There are good reasons to believe that these laws have been counterproductive, as
many critics have charged. Arguably, marijuana prohibition diverts resources from
more pressing drug- or crime-control agendas; encourages discriminatory enforcement;
stymies ameliorative regulation; and consigns users to deal with criminal drug
traffickers, if not lawyers, courts, and jails.6 There are many who dispute these claims;
2. Under the federal drug laws, marijuana is designated a Schedule I controlled substance,
a status reserved for drugs with the most serious potential for abuse, no medical benefit, and no
safe method of use. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2006). For a detailed description of why marijuana
does not satisfy the three tenets of § 812(b)(1), see infra note 78. This status places marijuana
on a par with heroin, and in a graver category than cocaine and OxyContin, which are both
included in Schedule II. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. 11(a).
3. See Sally Satel, Commentary, A Whiffof "Reefer Madness" in U.S. Drug Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at F6 (commenting that ONDCP places more emphasis on controlling
marijuana than methamphetamine, heroin, or cocaine because marijuana is a gateway to more
dangerous drugs); see also Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The
Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s, HARM REDUCTION J., Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.harmreductionjoumal.com/contents/3/1/6 (stating that "since 1990, the primary
focus of the war on drugs has shifted to low-level marijuana offenses"). Barry McCaffiey, drug
czar under Bill Clinton, and John Walters, drug czar under George W. Bush, both invested
heavily in advertising against marijuana, which they saw as the key to winning the War on
Drugs. Ben Wallace-Wells & Eric Magnuson, How America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING
STONE, Dec. 13, 2007, at 107, 110. Whether this policy continues under the Obama
administration remains to be seen.
4. In 2006, there were approximately 742,900 arrests for possession of marijuana,
constituting 39.1% of the roughly 1.9 million drug arrests. CRIMNALJUSTICE INFO. SERVS. Div.,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PERSONS ARRESTED: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006 (2007),
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006//arrests/index.html [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2006]. In 2005, there were almost 767,000 marijuana arrests, and nearly 680,000 of them were
for marijuana possession. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. Div., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
PERSONS ARRESTED: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005 (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
05cius/arrests/index.html; see also JIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS
AND REALISTIC CONTROLS 274 tbI.A.2 (2008) (finding that 81% of all 2005 drug arrests and 88%
of all marijuana arrests were for possession rather than sale or manufacture).
5. Citing the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the ONDCP reports that "an
estimated 100 million Americans aged 12 or older have tried marijuana at least once in their
lifetimes, representing 40.6% of the U.S. population in that age group." Office of Nat'l Drug
Control Policy, Marijuana Facts & Figures, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact
/marijuana/marijuanaff.html#extentofuse. In 2002, a poll conducted by Time and CNN found
that as many as 47% of Americans had tried the drug. Joel Stein, The New Politics of Pot: Can
It Go Legit?: How the People Who Brought You Medical Marijuana Have Set Their Sights on
Lifting the Ban for Everyone, TIME, Oct. 27, 2002, at 56.
6. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43 (2009). For other criticism of marijuana
criminalization, see generally CANADIAN SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, CANNABIS:
[Vol. 85:279
LIBERTY LOST
but, both proponents and opponents of marijuana prohibition generally argue in
pragmatic terms: their focus is on what will work best to achieve either "a drug-free
America" (in the government's rendition) or a reduction of harm to users (in the
reformer's rendition).7
Such debates are crucial elements in any examination of marijuana law and policy,
but they ignore the deeper level of justification that may be required for restraints on
individual liberty, of which marijuana criminalization is arguably an instance.
Restraints on religious practice, for example, cannot properly be evaluated by merely
calculating the utilitarian costs and benefits; something of greater moral weight is
required to override the fundamental right to free exercise of religion. A key threshold
issue regarding the prohibition and criminalization of marijuana use is whether such
laws implicate fundamental individual rights, and, if so, what grounds are required to
justify doing so.
In this Essay, we argue that these laws do unjustifiably infringe upon fundamental
moral rights. We present a nonconsequentialist, civil libertarian case against marijuana
prohibition and criminalization based on the requirements of liberty and just
punishment. Our focus is on an individual's moral rights-the kind of human rights
that should be reflected in law, whether they are or not. We recognize that courts are
unlikely to revisit precedents generally upholding marijuana crimes against
constitutional challenges, at least in the near term. 8 Our concern here, however, is what
OUR POSITION FOR A CANADIAN PUBLIC PoLIcY (2002), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
common/Committee SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= 1&comm id=85 (concluding
that criminalization of cannabis is not supported by scientific data and criminalization policies
have been ineffective); ROBERT J. MAcCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING
FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES & PLACES (2001) (analyzing the legitimacy and effectiveness of
American drug policy); NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/Library
/studies/nc/ncmenu.htm (arguing that discouraging the use of cannabis may be desirable but that
criminalization of possession for personal use is a socially self-defeating means to that
objective); Duncan Campbell, Ex-Drugs Policy Director Calls for Legalisation, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 13, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/aug/13/
drugs.legislation.
7. For two prominent exceptions that assess exclusively the moral rights at stake in the
drug war generally, see DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992); Michael Moore,
Liberty and Drugs, in DRUGS AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 61 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 1999).
8. Many courts have rejected constitutional challenges to marijuana possession laws. See,
e.g., John C. Williams, Annotation, Constitutionality of State Legislation Imposing Criminal
Penalties for Personal Possession or Use of Marijuana, 96 A.L.R.3d. 225 (1979) (providing a
long list of state court decisions upholding marijuana-possession convictions). Specifically,
courts have rejected claims that marijuana use is protected by the Free Exercise Clause and state
analogs. E.g., United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 511-13 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824-26 (11 th Cir. 1982); State v. Hardesty, 204 P.3d 407,413, 418
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 214 P.3d 1004 (Ariz. 2009); State v. Balzer, 954 P.2d 931,942
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998). Most courts have also rejected claims that personal marijuana use is a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding
the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I substance on a rational-basis test, and rejecting
strict-scrutiny analysis because "there is no constitutional right to import, sell, or possess
marijuana"); Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 130-34
(D.D.C. 1980) (holding that personal use of marijuana is not a fundamental right). But see Ravin
2010)
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the law should be, not whether existing law satisfies the constitutional minimum, and
in making that determination, legislators, no less than judges, should attend to the
claims of liberty and human rights that may be at stake.
Prevailing marijuana-possession laws contain two components: the ban on
marijuana use ("prohibition"), and the criminal punishment imposed on its users.
Prohibition need not include criminal penalties for possession; alcohol prohibition did
not, 9 and the decriminalization movement seeks the same for marijuana.
These two measures-prohibiting use and punishing users-each implicate
individual liberty, but they do so in different ways that raise very different concerns.
Prohibition only targets access to the drug (and the freedoms that are lost by its
unavailability), and it raises the question of whether individuals have a moral right to
use marijuana. By contrast, criminally punishing a user may confiscate her freedom
altogether and always inflicts moral censure. Such punishment is justifiable only if the
defendant deserves it. It is not enough that the citizenry will benefit from punishing
marijuana users, for example, by deterring the drug trade; the offender must have
engaged in some blameworthy, wrongful conduct that can justify moral and legal
guilt. 0 As C.S. Lewis wrote, "Desert is the only connecting link between punishment
v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding marijuana use and possession in one's home are
protected under a state constitutional privacy right). We can, however, envision a different result
in the future if attitudes toward marijuana change, or if the Supreme Court's recent libertarian
interpretation of the right to privacy takes root. See infra Part II.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Eighteenth
Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol, but the possession
and consumption of alcohol remained legal during prohibition. Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct
Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for
Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1, 12 (2004).
10. Under the retributive principle, punishment may not be inflicted on the innocent or on
the guilty beyond their desert, even if doing so would achieve a greater good for others. Desert
is usually taken to be a function of the gravity of the crime and the blameworthiness of the
criminal. Accordingly, it is not acceptable to punish the mother of a suicide bomber, even if it is
the only way to deter future bombings. Nor can desert be based on the mere fact that the
defendant freely chose to violate a duly passed law. Otherwise, any criminal law regime would
be self-justifying, so that criminalizing singing would justify punishing a yodeler. What is
missing from both of these examples is blameworthy conduct that underwrites moral guilt.
The retributive principle most centrally embodies respect for the right of autonomous
individuals to determine their futures. For extended treatment of the principle as applied to
criminal law, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY (1970); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797) (propounding the "formula of humanity"); JOHN
KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968); Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive CriminalLaw--A Dialogue, 29 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980) ("It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment
entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the person is not
blameworthy."); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).
There are a few theorists, however, who defend punishing the innocent if sufficient benefits
would result. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors ofRetributivism, 24
MELB. U. L. REv. 124 (2000); J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in
UTILITARIANISM 3, 69-72 (John Jamieson Carswell ed., 1973). That theory underlies strict-
liability laws in some states that arguably punish blameless conduct for utilitarian reasons. But




Are these necessary conditions satisfied in the case of American marijuana laws?
We first consider whether criminal sanctions can be justified and then turn to
prohibition laws that simply put marijuana beyond reach.
I. PUNISHING USERS
A. Grounds Purported to Justify Criminalization
Is marijuana possession-or the marijuana use for which possession is a proxy-the
kind of wrongful conduct that is a prerequisite for criminal punishment of its users? At
its most expansive, the indictment against marijuana use puts forth four types of
putative moral wrongs inflicted by marijuana use to justify criminally punishing its
users. Marijuana use is alleged to inflict harm on others; inflict harm on users; make
users unproductive members of society; and be immoral in itself.
But two questions must be asked of each claim: Does marijuana use actually
perpetrate the wrong alleged? And is this type of wrong sufficient to justify criminal
penalties? We consider each claim in turn.
1. Harm to Others
Undeniably, acts that seriously and wrongfully injure others, or seriously risk injury
to others, can be criminalized. Such an act, coupled with mens rea, is the paradigmatic
case warranting criminal penalties. Thus, the question here is not one of principle but
one of fact: does marijuana use wrongfully injure others?
No one can reasonably claim that the private use of marijuana at home inflicts direct
harm on others the way a battery does. The claim must be that marijuana use has
further effects that do inflict harm. One way this might be so is if marijuana regularly
lead users to engage in subsequent criminal activity. Ifmarijuana stimulated aggression
or was addictive and expensive enough to lead users to engage in crime to finance their
habits, the state might treat marijuana possession as an inchoate crime akin to reckless
driving, possession of burglarious implements, or other acts that threaten imminent and
defending marijuana criminalization on that basis. Because each person's happiness (or
alternative utility measure) counts equally, the harms inflicted on the defendant by his loss of
liberty must count in the balance along with the costs involved in fostering criminal enterprises
dependent upon a black market; devoting large amounts of police, court, and prison resources to
marijuana law enforcement; and/or the harms that result from diverting resources away from
more destructive crimes. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C.K. Ogden ed.,
Richard Hildreth trans., Morrison & Gibb, Ltd. 1931) (1802); 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 10 (1984) [hereinafter 1 FEINBERG, HARM TO
OTHERS] (listing practical costs resulting from any penal statute and concluding that "merely to
show that there is a morally relevant reason for a particular penal statute is not yet to show that it
is sufficient or conclusive reason in the case at hand").
11. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 71, 72 (John R. Burr & Milton Goldinger eds., 1972). Lewis adds that
when the focus of criminal punishment becomes deterrence or rehabilitation rather than desert,
"instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a 'case."' Id.
20101
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serious harm. But no one can reasonably argue that marijuana generally causes its users
to engage in crime, and ample research shows that it does not.
12
The alternative that drug-war proponents invoke is downstream, noncriminal harm
allegedly caused by marijuana use. James Q. Wilson justifies criminalization of some
drugs because they result in "more accidents, higher insurance premiums, bigger
welfare costs, and less effective classrooms.' 13 We accept that marijuana use cannot be
described as wholly self-regarding because, like almost everything else we do, it has an
impact on others. But such downstream effects, even bad ones, cannot alone justify
criminal punishment, or we would be punishing people for eating fatty foods and
drinking alcohol.
There are at least two reasons why such indirect harms are neither wrongful nor
blameworthy in the way just punishment requires. First, the chain of causation from an
individual's marijuana use to Wilson's litany of harms is so distended, and so
dependent on volitional acts by others, that no concept of proximate causation used in
criminal law could connect the two. And second, causing damage to another-even
with intent to do so-is not enough to justify the criminal sanction; the harm must
12. See, e.g., BRITISH ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE MISUSE OFDRUGs, THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CANNABIS UNDER THE MISUSE OF DRUGS ACT 1971 (2002), available at http://
drugs.homeoffice.gov.uk/publication-search/acmd/cannabis-class-misusedrugs-ct?view=Binary,
NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 68-76; PeterN.S. Hoaken &
Sherry H. Stewart, Drugs of Abuse and the Elicitation of Human Aggressive Behavior, 28
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 1533 (2003).
Faced with a similarly tenuous assertion, the Supreme Court stated, "[g]iven the present
state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the
ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books
on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits." Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969). The inchoate-crime argument comes closer to the mark when applied
to heroin or crack cocaine, but even use of these drugs would be difficult to fit into existing
doctrine. Cases holding that commission of an inchoate act is sufficient to constitute a criminal
attempt do so on the basis that it is a "substantial step" toward the commission of a crime (or in
some states, has sufficient proximity to it) and was done with specific intent to commit it. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2(c), (d) (4th ed. 2003). But even in the case of heroin or
cocaine, use will not constitute a substantial step or proximate act most of the time, so it would
be hard to justify punishing all who use the drug rather than only those who commit subsequent
criminal acts. In an earlier era, John Stuart Mill took this position regarding laws against
drunkenness: if an intoxicated person assaults another, punish him for assault, not for
intoxication, he argued. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 159 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
13. James Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in DRUGS AND CRIME 521, 524 (Michael Tonry &
James Q. Wilson eds., 1990). The ONDCP, under drug czar William Bennett, shared Wilson's
view, stating that "[d]rug users make inattentive parents, bad neighbors, poor students, and
unreliable employees-quite apart from their common involvement in criminal activity." OFFICE
OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 7 (1989). Nancy
Reagan conveyed the same idea in more hyperbolic form when she described all casual drug
users as "accomplice[s] to murder." Stephen Chapman, Nancy Reagan andthe Real Villains in
the Drug War, in THE CRISIS IN DRUG PROHIBITION 119, 119 (David Boaz ed., 1991). Of course,
the prohibition law that leaves drug production to organized crime would make the government
an "accomplice to murder" by the same theory.
[Vol. 85:279
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result from a wrongful act that invades some moral right of another.' 4 John F. Kennedy
may have destroyed the haberdashery industry by refusing to wear a hat throughout his
presidency, but he did not do so by invading any right. Similarly, the student who
Wilson thinks will perform poorly in school invades no one's rights by doing so.
If marijuana criminalization cannot be justified on grounds of harm to others, the
case for criminalization is severely weakened. The consensus that supports criminal
penalties for acts that inflict harm on others breaks down in the absence of such
victimization. A great number of Americans probably would subscribe to Mill's "harm
principle," which holds that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is ... to prevent harm to others .... Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.' 15 Nevertheless, the ONDCP and other
criminalization proponents believe criminal punishment is warranted on one or more
other grounds that we explore next.
2. Sins of Omission
Someone who fails a friend in need or contributes nothing to the community might
be said to damage others by her absence. On this view, if marijuana users are
constantly in a haze, or fall prey to the so-called "amotivational syndrome," they may
damage society by inaction-by failing to contribute to it.
Some people may describe such contributions as morally virtuous but not morally
required.' 6 Others might deem them moral duties and the failure to perform them
morally wrong.' 7 But few would argue that failing to contribute to society is a
sufficient ground for criminal punishment. As every law student is taught, criminalizing
omissions is alien to the American criminal law tradition absent a legal duty between
the actor and the person in need. A parent may be convicted of criminal homicide for
failing to rescue his child if he can, but even Heimlich would bear no criminal liability
for failing to save a stranger choking at the next table.' 8 And there are good reasons for
14. See I FEINBERG, HARM TO OTnERs, supra note 10; MILL, supra note 12. Mill argued, on
social contract grounds, that we each must "observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest."
MILL, supra note 12, at 139. On one side of the line, subject to state compulsion, are (1) the
burdens required for mutual protection and (2) not injuring certain interests of others, "which,
either by express legal provision or tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights." Id. On
the other side of the line, and exempt from state compulsion, are "[t]he acts of an individual
[that] may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going
the length of violating any of their constituted rights." Id.
15. MILL, supra note 12, at 80. For modem elaborations of the harm principle, see I
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTfERs, supra note 10; H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
(1963); Dennis J. Baker, Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle, 27 CRIM. JUST. ETUcs 3
(2008) (arguing that wrongful harm to others provides the only moral justification for sending
people to jail).
16. See JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 39-40 (Broadview Press 2001) (1988).
17. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, I PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 229
(1972) (arguing that the failure of people in affluent nations to help others in need is morally
unjustifiable).
18. Criminal law casebooks continue to use the famous case of Jones v. United States, 308
F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (reversing involuntary manslaughter conviction based on failure to
2010]
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generally limiting an individual's responsibility to acts of commission, and excluding
sins of omission, having to do with respect for a rational, self-directing person's right
to control the essential shape of her own life. 19
If one's failure to rescue a stranger in dire straits is properly beyond the reach of
criminal sanctions, one's failure to contribute to society must be as well, a fortiorari;
and if these failures are not crimes, how can it be a crime to use a drug, which, by
hypothesis, merely makes such a failure somewhat more likely?
The other, alternative ground for rejecting this claim is that its application to
marijuana use is not empirically well supported. Recent research casts doubt on the
amotivational-syndrome claim, 20 and numerous other activities, including video
gaming and television watching, may well have a greater immobilizing influence than
marijuana use. There are too many counterexamples of cultural icons who used
marijuana regularly during highly fertile periods-for example, Robert Altman,
Charles Baudelaire, the Beatles, Francis Crick, Ken Kesey, Richard Feynman, Steven
Jay Gould, Allen Ginsberg, Aldous Huxley, Jack Kerouac, Robert Parish, Diego
Rivera, Carl Sagan, and Rick Steves 21-and too many political candidates for high
office who have admitted using marijuana 22 for anyone to be confident that the typical
marijuana user is destined to lead an unproductive existence.
feed baby because no instruction requiring finding of legal duty), and/or Pace v. State, 224
N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 1967) (reversing a robbery conviction because defendant was merely present
in the car in which a robbery took place), to illustrate this principle. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER,
CASES AND MAT[ERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 137, 883 (4th ed. 2007).
19. If duties extended beyond that point, there would be no end to one's obligations
regarding strangers and no space for the special responsibilities one should feel toward family,
friends, community, and one's own life. The deontological distinctions that limit the scope of
our obligations-between acts and omissions and between intended and unintended
consequences-place us in control of our own lives, and, most of the time, correspond to our
everyday intuitions about moral requirements.
20. See Peter L. Nelson, Cannabis Amotivational Syndrome and Personality Trait
Absorption: A Review andReconceptualization, 14 IMAGINATION COGNITION & PERSONALITY 43
(1994).
21. See, e.g., MARTIN BOOm, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 267-68 (2003) (Huxley); LESTER
GRNSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 141 (1993) (Gould);
MARTIN H. LEVINSON, THE DRUG PROBLEM: A NEW VIEW USING THE GENERAL SEMANTICS
APPROACH 85 (2002) (Baudelaire); PATRICK McGLLIGAN, ROBERT ALTMAN: JUMPING OFF THE
CLIFF 245-47 (1989) (Altman); BARRY MILES, JACK KEROUAC: KING OF THE BEATS 141 (1998)
(Kerouac); BARRY MILES, PAUL MCCARTNEY: MANY YEARS FROM Now 184-93 (1997)
(Beatles); PAUL PERRY, ON THE Bus: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE LEGENDARY TRIP OF KEN
KESEY AND THE MERRY PRANKSTERS AND THE BRmT OF THE COUNTERCULTURE 113 (1990)
(Kesey); MATT RIDLEY, FRANCIS CRICK: DISCOVERER OF THE GENETIC CODE 156 (2006) (Crick);
ANDREW WEIL & WINIFRED ROSEN, FROM CHOCOLATE TO MORPHINE: EVERYTHING You NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT MIND-ALTERING DRUGS 19 (1998) (Rivera); Nicole Brodeur, Rick Steves Is Just a
NORML Guy, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at BI (Steves); Allen Ginsberg, The Great
Marijuana Hoax: First Manifesto to End the Bringdown, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1966, at
104, 107-11 (Ginsberg); Parish Admits Validity of Marijuana Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1993, at B8 (Parish); Lester Grinspoon, To Smoke or Not to Smoke: A Cannabis Odyssey,
MARIJUANA USES, Apr. 20, 2009, http://marijuana-uses.com/essays/001.html [hereinafter
Grinspoon, To Smoke] (Feynman); Carl Sagan, Mr. X, MARIJUANA USES, http://www.marijuana-
uses.com/essays/002.htm (Sagan).




How one lives one's life raises fundamental questions of value; what constitutes a
life worth living has been a central ethical question for millennia. But answering that
question for oneself is one thing; jailing those whose answers differ from the
government's, as Bush administration drug czar John Walters suggested, is a far
different one. Walters argued that marijuana "destroys the soul" and that the extreme
"moral poverty" of its users requires "stiff and certain punishment. 2 3
Can incarceration of marijuana users bejustified on this basis? Or on the perceived
immorality of living a self-indulgent life, or substituting an artificial paradise for one's
natural, God-given lot? The criminal law has sometimes been used to enforce morality
for morality's sake, as with the criminalization of homosexual acts, but rarely anymore.
There are two problems. First, too many people now doubt that conduct can be
immoral if it neither risks nor produces harmful effects; the views of earlier natural law
theorists that entirely private conduct such as masturbation is immoral mystifies them.
Second, multicultural societies now see too clearly the illegitimacy of enforcing the
moral code of some upon others who disagree with it in the absence of harm to
others.24 They know that one era's condemnation of certain victimless behavior as
24, 2006, at A21 (reporting on Barack Obama's marijuana-use admission and contrasting it with
former President Bill Clinton's admission); see also JOSEPH R. BLANEY & WILLIAM L. BENOIT,
THE CLINTON SCANDALS AND THE POLITICS OF IMAGE RESTORATION 59-62 (2001) (discussing
how political figures such as Bill Clinton and Clarence Thomas restored their images after
admissions of marijuana use).
23. RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBITION
POLITICS 57 (2004) (quoting WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIuLIo & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY
COUNT: MORAL POVERTY AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS
(1996)).
24. Joel Feinberg takes this position in his seminal work. 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988). He subscribes to a modified
version of Mill's harm principle, in which "harm" refers to "those states of set-back interest that
are the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others." 1 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS,
supra note 10, at 215.
Two who famously disagree, and argue that private consensual conduct not affecting others
that is deemed immoral may be criminalized, are Justice Antonin Scalia and Lord Devlin.
Justice Scalia dissented in the Lawrence v. Texas antisodomy case, arguing that the majority's
ruling "effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation," explicitly including laws against
masturbation. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
Scalia, immorality is a sufficient and constitutional ground for criminalization.
Lord Devlin's argument is quite different. In response to Britain's Wolfenden Report, which
recommended eliminating criminalization of homosexuality, Lord Devlin wrote a celebrated
essay justifying the continued criminalization of conduct deemed immoral, not for morality's
sake, but because if the criminal system looks the other way in the face of popular outrage, a
social breakdown will ensue. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-26 (1965). As
such, his argument was a peculiar species of the harm-to-others argument, and perhaps was a
precursor to theories propounded in recent years by "broken windows" social scientists and
others who view law as a way for felicitous norms that control populations to be created or
maintained. See also James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENTARY, Feb.
1990, at 21, 26. Wilson argues against decriminalization of cocaine on the grounds that
"dependency on certain mind-altering drugs is a moral issue and that their illegality rests in part
on their immorality." We treat cocaine differently than nicotine, he writes, because "nicotine
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immoral often looks like sheer prejudice in a later one. Perhaps that is why the
Supreme Court overruled its decision upholding the criminalization of homosexual sex
a mere sixteen years after handing it down. Finding homosexual sex constitutionally
protected in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court wrote, "the fact that a State's
governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."
25
4. Harming One's Own Welfare
Is the case for criminalization any stronger if the supposed immorality has the effect
of harming one's own welfare? (Whether marijuana in fact does harm its users is
disputed.)26 Harms to oneself may warrant state intervention and sometimes even civil
laws prohibiting use-we take up that question momentarily-but even in those cases,
does not destroy the user's essential humanity. Tobacco shortens one's life; cocaine debases it.
Nicotine alters one's habits, cocaine alters one's soul .... Id. But he notes that marijuana
presents a different problem from cocaine or heroin and takes no position on its
decriminalization. Id. at 23.
25. 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). Invalidating a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy, the Court observed that
"' [o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' Id. at 571
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). In his dissent,
Justice Scalia proclaimed that Lawrence "effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation."
Id. at 599.
26. Most research studies have concluded that the casual use of marijuana is not harmful to
most users, or at least not as harmful as cigarettes, alcohol, and most other recreational drugs.
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, CANNABIS (1968), available at
http://www.ukcia.org/research/wootton/index.htm; BRITSH ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE MISUSE
OF DRUGS, supra note 12, at 11 (finding that even heavy use of marijuana "is not associated with
major health problems for the individual or society"); COMM. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
HABITUAL BEHAVIOR, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AN ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY (1982),
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=662; INT'L INFO. & COMMC'N DIV.,
NETH. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Q & A: DRUGS: A GUIDE TO DUTCH POLICY (2002); DAVID
MCDONALD, RHONDA MOORE, JENIFER NORBERRY, GRANT WARDFLAw & NICILA BALLENDEN,
NAT'L TASK FORCE ON CANNABIS, LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR CANNABIS IN AUSTRALIA (1994);
NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6 at 130-31 (recommending
decriminalization, finding that "experimental" or "intermittent use" resulted in little danger of
physical and psychological harm); Editorial, Dangerous Habits, 352 THE LANCET 1565 (1998)
(summarizing study finding cannabis less of a threat than alcohol or tobacco and also that
moderate indulgence in cannabis has little ill effect on health); cf. ROBIN ROOM, BENEDIKT
FISCHER, WAYNE HALL, SIMON LENTON & PETER REUTER, THE BECKLEY FOUND., CANNABIS
POLICY: MOVING BEYOND THE STALEMATE (2008), http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/
Conclusions and Recommendations.pdf (concluding that the "probability and scale of harm
among heavy cannabis users is modest compared with that caused by many other psychoactive
substances, both legal and illegal, in common use, namely, alcohol, tobacco, amphetamines,
cocaine and heroin"). Other studies have found marijuana detrimental to physical and mental
health. See, e.g., George C. Patton, Carolyn Coffey, John B. Carlin, Louisa Degenhardt, Micheal
Lynskey & Wayne Hall, Cannabis Use and Mental Health in Young People: Cohort Study, 325
BRIT. MED. J. 1195, 1195-98 (2002) (finding a possible link between marijuana use and
increased risk for depression and anxiety); see also NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, INFOFACTS:
MARIJUANA (2009), http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/InfoFacts/Marijuana09.pdf (citing studies).
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harm to oneself cannot be seen as the type of moral wrong that should be criminally
punished. An act harmful to self-interest may reflect a weak will rather than a bad one,
or poor judgment rather than criminal intent. It is difficult to fit self-inflicted harms
into the idea of desert, which ethicist James Rachels defines as the principle that
"[p]eople deserve to be treated in the same way that they have (voluntarily) treated
others.",
2 7
The other problem concerns the equal respect the government owes to all its
citizens. Few people believe that marijuana is more harmful to users than presently
legal (but regulated) substances such as nicotine or alcohol.28 If marijuana is not more
harmful, then throwing only some people into the maw of the criminal justice system
while leaving others free to indulge their no-more-important pleasures cannot be
justified on grounds of danger to the user alone.
None of the four putative grounds for punishing marijuana users successfully
establishes that they committed the kind of wrongful, blameworthy conduct that
deserves criminal punishment. To quote C.S. Lewis once more: "take away desert and
the whole morality of the punishment disappears. 29
B. Disproportionate Punishments
Defenders of the present marijuana laws must argue not only that criminalization is
justifiable but also that the punishment fits the crime. That too, is a difficult case to
make. It is true that only a small minority of first offenders receive sentences of
incarceration. 30 But those who are not imprisoned are still likely to experience
disproportionate suffering if arrested for marijuana use.31 These other unlucky users,
annually numbering between 700,000 and 800,000,32 will still lose their liberty through
arrest and/or pretrial detention for some period of time and have their lives centered
around lawyers, trial courts, legal fees, and probation officers for the following year or
more. Those who are convicted will be handicapped by legally imposed civil
disabilities, including ineligibility for government grants and contracts, 33 public
27. James Rachels, Punishment and Desert, in ETHIcs IN PRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 470,
473 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 1997).
28. See, e.g., Dangerous Habits, supra note 26, at 1565.
29. Lewis, supra note 11, at 74.
30. See MAcCouN & REUTER, supra note 6, at 344 (reporting that annually between 1990
and 1995, about 4000 people received federal prison sentences for marijuana offenses and
approximately 11,000 people received state sentences; the proportion of offenders convicted of
offenses involving sale is not reported).
31. We describe this suffering, and the inhumane outlook that has produced it, in more
detail in our companion article, No Rational Basis, from which these two paragraphs are
adapted. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 6, at 59-62.
32. In 2006, 43.9% of the 1,889,810 total arrests for drug-abuse violations were for
marijuana-a total of 829,627. See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006, supra note 4.
33. Grants, licenses, contracts, and some other federal benefits are restricted as to drug
offenders. 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2006). At the court's discretion, first offenders convicted of a
federal or state drugpossession offense may be rendered ineligible for all federal benefits for up
to one year, and second offenders may remain ineligible for up to five years. Id § 862(b). The
sanctions may be waived if offenders declare themselves to be addicts and undergo treatment or
are declared rehabilitated. Id. § 862(b)(2).
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
housing,34 and, depending on the state, driver's licenses, 35 occupational licenses,36 and
voting.37 Offenders may even forfeit their land, house, or bank account under laws that
transfer most of the drug "instrumentalities" or "proceeds" to the budget of the law-
enforcement agency that seized them.38 Another law strips college students of their
federal student loans for a single marijuana-possession offense. 39 A high school student
34. The Supreme Court has even upheld the eviction of a drug user's parents on the basis of
their child's drug use, even if the drug use took place outside of the home and the parents knew
nothing about it. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(/)(6) (2000)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a) (2006) (providing that a person
previously evicted from federally assisted housing by reason of drug-related criminal activity is
ineligible for admission to any federally assisted housing for three years).
35. Offenders may forfeit their licenses even when the marijuana arrest had nothing to do
with driving or being in a car. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.055 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §
40-5-75 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-259.1 (2004); see also 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2006) (denying
portion of highway funds to states that do not suspend the driver's license of drug felons).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(5), 3583(d) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)-(d) (2006); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5F 1.5(a), 5F 1.6 (2008) (authorizing sentencing court to
place occupational restrictions as conditions of probation and setting limitations on federal
benefits, including professional licenses, commercial licenses, grants, contracts, and loans); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (setting forth rules of ineligibility for listed positions involving
employee-benefit plans); Kathleen M. Olivares, Velmer S. Burton & Francis T. Cullen, The
Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10
Years Later, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10 (noting six states permanently restrict felons
from public office, ten states leave the discretion to hire with the employer, twelve states apply a
test to determine if the conviction bears on the offender's ability to handle the job, and only
seventeen states allow public employment after the completion of the prison sentence).
37. As of 2003, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia permitted all felons to vote
after prison release or sentence completion; another seven states permitted some felons to vote
after sentence completion; in the other seven states, the right to vote can be restored only after
executive or legislative clemency. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS STANDARD 37 n.47
(3d ed. 2004).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(a) (2006). Seizures accomplished exclusively by state or local agencies
may be "adopted" by the federal government whenever the conduct giving rise to the seizure is
in violation of federal law. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATIORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON SEIZED AND FORFEITED PROPERTY (1990), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/seized.htm#federal. When the federal government has
"adopted" a state forfeiture case, 80% of judicially or administratively forfeited assets are
allocated to the state or local agency for law-enforcement purposes, and the remaining 20% goes
to the federal government. ASSET FORFEITURE AND MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 12
(2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/afinls/pubs/ pdf/guidetoeq09.pdf. In joint
seizures, the share is allocated on a case-by-case determination based on the amount of work
each agency performed. § 881 (e)(3); see also Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policingfor Profit:
The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Cmi. L. REV. 35, 44-55 (1998).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2006). This 1998 law suspends or forever terminates a drug
offender's eligibility for federal college loans and grants. Initially, the law applied to anyone
with a conviction at any time, but a recent amendment excludes convictions prior to college. See
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8021(c), 120 Stat. 4, 178 (2006). The
periods of ineligibility vary depending upon the number of convictions and whether they
[Vol. 85:279
LIBERTYLOST
risks mandatory expulsion under zero-tolerance drug policies in an estimated eighty-
eight percent of public schools; 40 an immigrant may face deportation;4I a parent risks
losing child custody to protection agencies or the other parent; the unemployed
confrontjob application forms eliciting their criminal records; and all offenders remain
at serious risk of incarceration for a probation violation or a second arrest. And apart
from such consequences there is the criminal conviction, a public mark of societal
condemnation that in itself is no small thing.42
One must juxtapose lives turned upside down in these ways with the nature of the
offense, no different than the activities of millions of other Americans who use other
intoxicating substances for similar reasons. Such grossly disproportional punishments
can hardly be said to fit the offender's crime.
II. PREVENTING USE
As we noted, even in the absence of criminal penalties, outlawing the use of
marijuana raises separate liberty concerns. How that putative liberty should be
described is a significant and consequential question; recall that the Supreme Court
found no "right to engage in homosexual sodomy" in Bowers v. Hardwick43 but later
overruled that case because the Constitution guarantees a "right to autonomy in
intimate relations."44 Similarly, some people may dismiss the issue here as merely a
resulted from possession or distribution of drugs-from a year of ineligibility for a single
possession conviction to permanent ineligibility for a second distribution or third possession
conviction. § 1091(r)(1). For a discussion of the constitutional and legal infirmities of this law,
see Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs
Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 68-71 (2002).
Tom Angell, a spokesman for Students for Sensible Drug Policy, reports that "more than
200,000 college students have lost financial aid in the past 10 years because of drug
convictions." Matthew Huisman & Jason Millman, As Frank Prepares Marijuana Bill, States
Make Own Efforts, S. COAST TODAY.COM, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.southcoasttoday.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=-/20080406/NEWS/804060373.
40. PHILLIP KAUFMAN, XIANGLLEI CHEN, SUSAN P. CHOY, SALLY A. RUDDY, AMANDA K.
MILLER, KATHRYN A. CHANDLER, CHRISTOPHER D. CHAPMAN, MICHAEL R. RAND & PATSY
KLAUS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY,
1999, at 119 tbl.A I (1999), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/1999057.pdf; see also Anne
Davis, Zero Tolerance Is Too Severe, Father Says Policy Is Subject of Meeting, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 1999, at 1 (reporting on a two-year expulsion applied to a first offender
caught with marijuana in a Milwaukee school). See generally Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen,
One Strike and You're Out? Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education,
81 WASH. U. L. REV. 65 (2003) (providing an overview of zero-tolerance expulsions).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). Because this provision also authorizes deportation
of anyone who is a "drug abuser or addict" even absent a conviction, id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii),
state decriminalization does not necessarily provide protection from deportation. Only deletion
of marijuana from the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006), would do so.
42 C.F.R. § 34.2(g), (h) (2008).
42. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) ("The stigma this criminal statute
imposes... is not trivial.... [I]t remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity
of the persons charged.").
43. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Court noted in Lawrence that it had previously
misapprehended the issue as "simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct," which
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question of whether there exists a fundamental "right to smoke marijuana," while
others might describe the right at issue, with Justice Brandeis, as the right to be let
alone absent good reason,45 or with Kant, as the right to self-rule. 6 Other moral rights
are arguably at stake, including the rights to control one's body, to freedom of thought,
to privacy in one's home, and to the pursuit of happiness. If any such individual rights
are involved, preventing marijuana use needs more justification than a collective cost-
benefit analysis alone.
The idea common to all these descriptions is that each person has certain
fundamental interests that must be under the individual's exclusive control and immune
from state interference. The Supreme Court has expressed this idea using the rubric of
a constitutional right to privacy 47 (and the Alaska Supreme Court has found private
marijuana use in one's home protected under its state version of the right).48 In
Lawrence v. Texas, the case that overturned Bowers, the Court described that right in
the following terms:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places.... And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence...
. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct.
demeaned "the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were
it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." Id. at 567.
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The
Founders] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
46. In Kant's philosophy, we are rational and moral agents who can each discern right and
wrong for ourselves; if the state does that for us, it denies us the respect due our autonomy, and
it also destroys our capacity to act morally, which can only come from the autonomous exercise
of one's own reason. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
199-201 (AmulfZweig trans. & ed., Thomas E. Hill, Jr. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
47. The constitutional right to privacy stems from the Supreme Court's recognition that the
Due Process Clause encompasses not only procedural due process but substantive due process
as well; a state infringement on fundamental rights is unconstitutional, however fair the
procedure. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). The Court has rejected the idea
that the Due Process Clause protects any generalized autonomy right, however. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997). Instead, the Court will recognize as constitutionally
protected only those rights that are (I) "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'
and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed,"' id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)), and (2)
"carefully" defined and described, id. at 722. Given the Court's distinction between liberty,
broadly understood, and the individual liberties recognized as constitutional guarantees-
assuming Lawrence does not portend a doctrinal shift-the moral rights argument we put
forward here should not be read as a prediction that the Supreme Court would find such a moral
right contained in the Constitution as a legal guarantee.
48. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
[Vol. 85:279
LIBERTY LOST
. ."At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State .... The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives.
' 49
Obviously, one's right to privacy, or what we might more affirmatively describe as a
right to self-ownership or self-rule, is limited. According to Mill, the right is limited
only by the harm principle: we must be free to choose for ourselves up to the point we
would harm or risk harm to others.50 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence can be
read as adding a second limitation on the right of self-rule, one that would permit
paternalism in some areas that are removed from the reasons for respecting individual
autonomy. In Kennedy's opinion for the Court, the right to self-rule apparently protects
only the realm most closely related to the essential attributes of personhood.5'
Requiring drivers to use seatbelts may not interfere with these attributes, but denying
individuals freedom of thought and expression, or the freedom to choose their intimate
relations, clearly does.
In assessing where marijuana use falls on this spectrum, one must attend to the
reasons individuals offer for using it. These reasons are almost completely absent from
drug policy analyses. 52 Here is naturalist Michael Pollan's description:
All those who write about cannabis's effect on consciousness speak of the
changes in perception they experience .... [T]hese people invariably report
seeing, and hearing, and tasting things with a new keenness, as if with fresh eyes
and ears and taste buds.
It is by temporarily mislaying much of what we already know (or think we
know) that cannabis restores a kind of innocence to our perceptions of the world
There is another word for this extremist noticing-this sense of first sight
unencumbered by knowingness, by the already-been-theres and seen-thats of the
adult mind-and that word, of course, is wonder.
53
Pollan finds using marijuana edifying because it opens the door to thoughts,
insights, and experiences he finds valuable. Rick Steves, the Public Broadcasting
Service travel guru, says that his outlook and writing have been sharpened by using
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
50. MILL, supra note 12, at 9.
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
52. See MAcCouN & REuTER, supra note 6, at 70 (citing R.S. Gable, Opportunity Costs of
Drug Prohibition, 92 ADDICTION 1179 (1997)).
53. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE BOTANY OF DEsiRE: A PLANT's-EYE VIEw oF THE WORLD 166-68
(2001) (emphasis in original).
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marijuana. 4 Some other users say that temporarily changing the way they perceive and
experience the world increases their self-awareness, or frees up some creative potential
within them, or opens them up to more spiritual feelings. 55 In the past year, the Italian
Court of Cassation reversed a marijuana conviction on such grounds, accepting the
Rastafarian defendant's contention that marijuana helped him achieve a
"psychophysical state connected to contemplative prayer. ' '56 On the other hand, many
former users and other critics would find these self-assessments to be delusional. Law
professor Michael Moore considers most such claims to be "grandiose descriptions of
what in fact is a pretty pathetic condition" and writes that "[o]ne has to be high on
[drugs] already in order to be able to judge the states induced as any kind of path to
profundity or 'authenticity."
57
One need not resolve this dispute concerning marijuana's value to recognize that at
least for its users, banning marijuana does implicate their freedom of thought and
sometimes even the "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."58 That is one reason why a ban on
marijuana cuts so close to core aspects of personhood-to the freedom of thought and
religion that are necessary to respect an autonomous being's ability to choose what to
think and what kind of person to be. That such thoughts, and such an identity, are not
esteemed by a majority of Americans and their government is really beside the point:
the very idea of this liberty is to protect each individual's sovereignty in this realm (as
the Supreme Court long ago recognized).59 Yet according to President Nixon's
54. Kevin Berger, The Other Side ofRick Steves, SALON.COM, Mar. 20,2009, http://www.
salon.com/mwt/feature/2009/03/20/rick steves/print.html.
55. See, e.g., ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND: AN INVESTIGATION OF DRUGS AND THE
HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS 149-87 (rev. ed. 1986) (describing the expanded thinking that results
from marijuana use); Lester Grinspoon, Learn, MARIJUANA USES, http://www.marijuana-
uses.com/leam.html (describing "marijuana's capacity to catalyze ideas and insights, heighten
the appreciation of music and art, or deepen emotional and sexual intimacy"); Grinspoon, To
Smoke, supra note 21 (describing "such disparate uses as the magnification of pleasure in a host
of activities ranging from dining to sex, the increased ability to hear music and see works of art,
and the ways in which it appears to catalyze new ideas, insights and creativity").
56. Peter Popham, Rastas Can Use Cannabis, Italian Court Rules, INDEPENDENT (United
Kingdom), July 12, 2008, at 32. In a second possession case, the court reversed the conviction
of a shepherd, finding the defendant justified in using it to help him endure a "long and solitary
period.., in the countryside and the mountains." Peter Popham, Silence ofLambs Justifies a
Joint for Lonely Shepherd, INDEPENDENT (United Kingdom), Mar. 21, 2009, at 32.
57. Moore, supra note 7, at 101.
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
59. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235 (1977) ("[I]n a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds .... [The idea that]
the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts .... is wholly
inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. . . . [Government] cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("[Freedom of thought] is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.... [T]he domain of
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National Commission on Marijuana, the war against marijuana, then beginning in
earnest, was fueled by fear that the drug caused users to reject the "established value
system."
60
A more quotidian moral right, perhaps less exalted but no less important, is
recognized in the Declaration of Independence as an inalienable right to the pursuit of
happiness. 61 This right should protect those who seek affective rather than cognitive
benefits from marijuana-users for whom it serves as a relaxant, a social lubricant, an
antidepressant, or a palliative. 62 The right to pursue happiness in one's own way is
worthy of respect, and many Americans disdain the Iranian government because it
affords none. There, the government bans certain dress and music that it deems
decadent.63 Here, the default position is that people should be free to pursue their
individual and idiosyncratic tastes in recreation, including even such risky ones as
boxing and mountain climbing. 64 Only in a few cases does the majority presume to
control the personal pleasures of a minority; marijuana use, even privately at home, is
one of them.
65
liberty... include[s] liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action."); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties.... They
believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensible to the
discovery and spread of political truth ....").
60. NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 8-9.
61. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Although the pursuit of
happiness appears in the Declaration of Independence rather than the Constitution, members of
the Supreme Court have found that the "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is
inalienable." Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 384 (1866) (Miller, J. dissenting). These
rights are fundamental and can only be removed by due process of law. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1872). The Court has cited the pursuit of happiness when
assessing the voting rights of African-Americans, see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 248
(1875) (Hunt, J. dissenting), the right to contraception, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,494 (1965) (Goldberg J., concurring) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478
(1927) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)), and the freedom to marry, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967). More recently, the Supreme Court has neglected to find that the pursuit of happiness
permits a prisoner to refuse antipsychotic drugs, see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238
(1990) (Stevens J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438,478 (1927) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)), or grants prisoners the right to DNA testing, see
Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2333 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., WEIL & ROSEN, supra note 21, at 116 ("Regular users may find that pot makes
them relaxed or more sociable without greatly affecting their perceptions or moods.").
63. Ali Akbar Dareini, Crackdown Issued on Dress Code, VIRGINIAN Pu.OT, Apr. 24,2007,
at A10; Nasser Karimi, Iran Revives Broadcast Ban on Western Music, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
2005, at A25.
64. Justice Brandeis's "right to be let alone," Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478
(1928) (Branseis J., dissenting), formulation eventually was adopted by the Court in Stanley v.
Georgia. 394 U.S. at 564 ("[The] makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit ofhappiness.... They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.").
65. That marijuana use often takes place in the privacy of one's home greatly compounds
the violation. As the Alaska Supreme Court stated in finding that the state constitutional right to
privacy should be extended to the marijuana use in one's home, "[i]fthere is any area of human
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This is not to say that the state should be unconcerned with marijuana use, because
it does present risks to health and safety, and both state and federal governments have
important roles to play in eliminating or reducing those risks. In liberal societies such
as ours, where the presumption is that individuals have the right to decide how to live
their lives for themselves, the government safeguards us not by making the decisions
for us but by helping us to make wise decisions with full knowledge. Thus the
government does not legislate your weight or dictate your diet, but it labels food and
advises on its health effects. Political philosopher William Talbott argues that the
fundamental idea underlying human rights is that people "should be guaranteed what is
necessary to be able to make their own judgments about what is good for them [and] to
be able to give effect to those judgments in living their lives., 66
Certainly, there are exceptions to this principle where the government properly
places something beyond the reach of its citizens for good reason. Many would include
among them instances where: (1) the dangers of a trivial activity are very great; (2) a
safer alternative can equally satisfy the consumer; (3) the individual is a child or lacks
rationality; (4) collective action is able to accomplish things impossible by individual
choice; or (5) the activity would result in an addiction so powerfully destructive of
autonomy as to amount to a form of slavery, which may be true of certain drugs.67
Liberty rights can be overcome by sufficiently compelling grounds. 6 8 But marijuana
does not present any such reason. As Pollan writes, "The war on drugs is in [reality] a
war on some drugs, their enemy status the result of historical accident, cultural
prejudice, and institutional imperative." 69
activity to which a right to privacy pertains more than any other, it is the home." Ravin v. State,
537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975). The court also noted the special rights afforded to conduct at
home in the United States Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence. Id. at 502-03; see also
Stanley, 534 U.S. at 565 (stating that the defendant was merely "asserting the right to read or
observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home").
66. WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL? 11 (2005).
67. Mill's view is that "[t]he principle of freedom cannot require that [a person] should be
free not to be free." MILL, supra note 12, at 164. Even if the activity had the effect of reducing
autonomy in a minority of people, it is a further question whether we should sacrifice the
freedom of many because of the abuse of a few-as we recognize in the case of alcohol.
68. The case we make for marijuana legalization neither precludes nor supports similar
arguments about other drugs. We may indeed have reason to reform laws governing other
substances, but any such reform must be predicated on careful study of the real harms, costs, and
benefits of the particular drug at issue and whether they constitute the kind of exception listed
above.
69. Michael Pollan, Opium, Made Easy: One Gardener's Encounter with the War on
Drugs, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1997, at 35. Bakalar and Grinspoon agree that drug prohibition
has been generated by history, not reason. JAMES BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG
CONTROL IN A FREE SOcIETY 68 (1984). They argue that Prohibition was repealed not because of
"scandals, inefficiencies and nasty side effects (these were never considered good reasons to
repeal other drug laws)," but because the middle class became less puritanical and wanted to
drink alcohol. Id. at 86.
[U]nlike opium and cocaine, alcohol was not an exotic substance with powers that
were frightening because mysterious. It was too familiar to be branded with the
narcotic stigma and too closely associated with innocent fun in too many
respectable people's minds to be purely a drug menace. Penalties for purchase and




The case for revisiting marijuana laws has special salience today because, for the
first time in decades, serious marijuana law reform appears to be achievable. Reform
bills or ballot initiatives have recently been approved in a number of'jurisdictions,70
President Obama and his new drug czar have suggested treating rather than jailing
nonviolent drug offenders,71 and Attorney General Holder has ordered a stop to federal
never reduced to the categories of medicine and vice.
Id. at 87-88.
70. Marijuana Policy Project, 2008 Ballot Initiatives (2009), http://www.mpp.org/library/
2008-ballot-initiatives.html. The Marijuana Policy Project reports that in Massachusetts, voters
decriminalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, substituting a $100 civil fine, by
a margin of 65% to 35%, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); that in
Michigan, voters changed the law to allow for medicinal use of marijuana on a doctor's
recommendation by a margin of 63% to 37%, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.26424 (West
Supp. 2009); and that in Hawaii County, Hawaii; Fayetteville, Arkansas; and several
Massachusetts towns, voters approved local ballot initiatives making enforcement of adult
marijuana-possession laws the lowest law-enforcement priority, by substantial majorities in each
case. Marijuana Policy Project, supra. However, California's Proposition 5, which would have
substituted treatment for incarceration for many nonviolent offenders and made marijuana
possession a civil infraction, was defeated 60% to 40%. Id. More than a dozen legislatures have
taken up measures to either reduce penalties for marijuana use or allow its use for treatment
purposes. Jesse McKinley, For Marijuana Advocates, Not-So-Secret Holiday Hints at Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at A13.
Recent polls also show substantial public support for marijuana law reform. For instance, a
2008 poll showed an extraordinary 72% of Massachusetts voters supported decriminalization
over current criminal penalties. Voters Say Yes to Decriminalizing Marijuana (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://www.suffolk.edu/30284.html. A 2009 California poll showed 56% of voters in favor of
legalizing and taxing marijuana. Rebecca Cathcart, Schwarzenegger Urges a Study on
Legalizing Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A21. Point-blank questions in
nationwide polls show a sentiment that may be surprising given the ONDCP's massive
antimarijuana advertising budget. For example, a 2002 CNN-Time poll found 72% of people
supported eliminating incarceration as a penalty for recreational marijuana use and 80%
supported legalized medical marijuana. Stein, supra note 5, at 57. A 2005 Gallup poll showed
36% of people favored outright legalization (and in the Western states, 47% for, versus 49%
against). Joseph Carroll, Who Supports Maryuana Legalization?, GALLUP, Nov. 1,2005, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/ 1956 l/Who-Supports-Marijuana-Legalization.aspx?. A November 2004
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) poll showed 72% of people middle aged or
older approved legalizing marijuana when a physician recommends it. AARP Poll Shows Most
Support Legalizing Medicinal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A36. Regarding drug
policy generally, a September 2008 Zogby poll reported 76% of likely voters deemed the drug
war a failure. Public Views Clash with U.S. Policy on Cuba, Immigration, and Drugs, INTER-
AMERICAN DIALOGuE (2008), http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfin?pagelD=403.
71. Gary Fields, White House Drug Czar Calls for End to "War on Drugs, " WALL ST. J.,
May 14, 2009, at A3 (reporting that Obama's new drug czar, Gil Kerlikowske, says the
administration "is likely to deal with drugs as a matter of public health rather than criminal
justice alone, with treatment's role growing relative to incarceration"); Carrie Johnson & Amy
Goldstein, Choice of Drug Czar Indicates Focus on Treatment, Not Jail, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2009, at A04 (discussing White House announcement about policy favoring treatment rather
than jail for drug offenders); Kurt Schmoke, Obama Not Completely Silent on the Drug War,
HUFFINGTON POST.COM, May 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kurt-schmoke/obama-
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prosecutions of medical-marijuana use in states that permit it.7 2 Governor
Schwarzenegger has proposed consideration of the legalization and taxation of
marijuana, and Rep. Barney Frank has introduced a decriminalization bill for the first
time in Congress because, he said, the public is now ready to support it.74 Elsewhere in
the world, marijuana use is increasingly seen as a personal matter, with
decriminalization gaining ground in many countries 75 and the Argentine high court
finding marijuana prohibition unconstitutional as a violation of personal autonomy.76
Given the destructive and inhumane consequences of marijuana laws and policies
(which we have catalogued elsewhere),77 any ameliorative reform effort should be
embraced. Worthy reform proposals include the removal of marijuana from federal
Schedule I into an appropriate lesser category, which would foster both scientific study
not-completely-sile-b_103122.html (detailing then-Senator Obama's remarks about drug
treatment on the campaign trail). In another sign that the Obama administration is rethinking
drug policy, the Justice Department has urged Congress to lower sentences for sale and
possession of crack cocaine so that they no longer exceed (by a factor of 100 to 1) those for
powdered cocaine. See Solomon Moore, Justice Dept. Seeks Equity in Sentencing for Cocaine,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A 17. President Obama's first budget, however, did not match his
rhetoric, proposing an increase in interdiction and law-enforcement funding (and a decrease for
drug education) compared with the last Bush levels; and, drug czar Kerlikowske says
legalization of marijuana is "not in the president's agenda under any circumstances." Tim
Dickinson, A Drug War Truce?, ROLLING STONE, June 25, 2009, at 45, 47.
72. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Ending Raids of Dispensers of Mari'uana for
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A20; McKinley, supra note 70 (citing remarks by
Attorney General Holder suggesting "federal law enforcement resources would not be used to
pursue legitimate medical marijuana users").
73. Cathcart, supra note 70 (also reporting that 56% of California voters support legalizing
and taxing marijuana for recreational use). Governor David Patterson of New York says that he
too would be open to a conversation about the legalization of marijuana. Dickinson, supra note
71, at 48.
74. Act to Remove Federal Penalties for the Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible
Adults, H.R. 5843, 110th Cong. (2008). Rep. Frank's bill would decriminalize possession of up
to 100 grams (or 3.5 ounces) of marijuana and also remove criminal penalties from users who
share marijuana with others so long as they do not sell it. Id. § 2. Frank announced his intention
to file the bill on Bill Maher's television program, stating that caution had prevented his doing
so for decades but that it was now time for politicians to "catch up to the public." Posting of
CitizenSugar to Tr~sSugar, http://www.tressugar.com/1138194 (Mar. 22, 2008, 10:00 EST).
75. The decriminalization movement has gained significant traction abroad in countries that
still criminalize possession. For example, the former presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and
Brazil recently summarized their report for The Latin-American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy in an Op-Ed in The Wall Street Journal. Femando Henrique Cardoso, Cdsar Gaviria
& Ernesto Zedillo, Op-Ed, The War on Drugs Is a Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A15.
That report concludes that prohibition and criminalization have not yielded expected results and
that Latin America is "farther than ever from the announced goal of eradicating drugs." Id. As a
possible correction for the drug problem, the report proposes "the careful evaluation, from a
public-health standpoint, of the possibility of decriminalizing the possession of cannabis for
personal use." Id.
76. Alexei Barrionuevo, Latin America Weighs Less Punitive Path to Curb Drug Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at A8.
77. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 6, at 59-62.
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of the drug and its medicinal use where appropriate; state and federal laws permitting
the medical use of marijuana;79 decriminalization of use and possession (as currently
exists in thirteen states),80 which would put an end to some of the worst excesses
afflicting users; and legalization, which would most fully respect individual liberty
while also allowing the government to control and regulate the marijuana market in
harm-reducing ways. If there is to be progress, reformers should welcome whatever
incremental steps may be possible, notwithstanding the stronger deontological
requirements associated with liberty claims. But whatever the political dynamics, we
should remember that moral rights are also at stake-the rights to a sphere of liberty in
personal matters, to prosecutions based on the principles ofjust punishment, and most
fundamentally, to a state that respects the individuality and autonomy of its people.
These civil libertarian concerns, well recognized in other contexts, should also inform
legislators and policy makers as marijuana law reform efforts move forward.
78. According to current knowledge, marijuana satisfies none of the three Schedule I
requirements: (1) it has a low potential for harm and abuse, see supra note 26; (2) it appears to
have therapeutic benefits, as the government itself claimed in its successful patent application,
see infra note 79; and (3) the American College of Physicians (ACP) suggests it may be used
safely under appropriate conditions, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, POSITION PAPER: SUPPORTING
RESEARCH INTO THE THERAPEUTIC ROLE OF MARIJUANA 4 (2008), available at
http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/ where we stand/other issues/medmarijuana.pdf. In its
position paper, the ACP "urges review of marijuana['s] status as a Schedule I controlled
substance and reclassification into a more appropriate schedule, given the scientific evidence
regarding marijuana's safety and efficacy in some clinical conditions." Id. at 15.
79. As of December 2008, the United States government continued to oppose medical
marijuana as useless, despite having patented the medicinal benefits of marijuana in an
application asserting cannabinoids' usefulness in preventing or treating diseases, including
stroke, trauma, autoimmune disorders, Parkinson's Disease, Alzheimer's Disease, and HIV
dementia. U.S. Patent No. 6,630,507 (filed Apr. 21, 1999).
80. States that have decriminalized at least some kinds ofmarijuana-possession offenses are
Alaska, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.010,.71.160 (2008); California, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11357 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-18-406
(West 2004 & Supp. 2008); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1102, 1107-A (2006
& Supp. 2008); Massachusetts, see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.02, 152.027 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); Mississippi,
see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-113, -139 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); Nebraska, see NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-405, -416 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2008); Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 453.336 (2005); New York, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008); see also
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2009); North Carolina, seeN.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90-94, -95 (West 2008); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3719.41
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009); and Oregon, see OR. REv. STAT. § 475.864 (2007).
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